Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University.
Psychol Bull. 2013 Jan;139(1):264-268. doi: 10.1037/a0029296.
Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, and Barrett (2013) critiqued our recent meta-analysis that reported the effects of discrete emotions on outcomes, including cognition, judgment, physiology, behavior, and experience (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). Lindquist et al. offered 2 major criticisms-we address both and consider the nature of emotion and scientific debate. Their 1st criticism, that the meta-analysis did not demonstrate emotion-consistent and emotion-specific changes in outcomes, appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of the method that we employed. Changes in outcomes were coded according to predictions derived from a functional discrete emotion account. Their 2nd criticism, that the findings are consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to emotion, is partially supported by the data and our statements in Lench et al. (2011). However, only 1 meta-analytic finding is relevant to this hypothesis, and it does not offer unequivocal evidence. Further, we contend that no modern discrete emotion theories would make the claims described by Lindquist et al. as representing a "natural kind" perspective and that viewing a scientific debate as a war has negative implications for the ability to evaluate evidence.
林德奎斯特、西格尔、奎格利和巴雷特（2013）批评了我们最近的一项荟萃分析，该分析报告了离散情绪对认知、判断、生理、行为和体验等结果的影响（伦奇、弗洛雷斯和本奇，2011）。林德奎斯特等人提出了 2 点主要批评——我们将同时讨论这两点，并考虑情绪和科学辩论的本质。他们的第 1 点批评是，荟萃分析没有显示出情绪在结果上的一致性和特异性变化，这似乎是基于对我们所采用方法的误解。结果的变化是根据功能离散情绪理论的预测进行编码的。他们的第 2 点批评是，这些发现与情绪的心理建构主义方法一致，部分得到了数据和我们在伦奇等人（2011）中的陈述的支持。然而，只有 1 项荟萃分析发现与这一假设相关，而且它并没有提供明确的证据。此外，我们认为，没有现代的离散情绪理论会支持林德奎斯特等人所描述的观点，即代表一种“自然类别”的观点，将科学辩论视为一场战争会对评估证据的能力产生负面影响。
