Heyd David
Department of Philosophy,The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91905 Jerusalem,
Perspect Biol Med. 2012;55(4):581-9. doi: 10.1353/pbm.2012.0041.
Synthetic biology does not create any ethical dilemmas that have not already been raised in the development of practices such as genetic screening, genetic engineering, and other interventions in the evolutionary processes. The issue is, nevertheless, ethically serious. Two different angles are examined: the philosophical legitimacy of human intervention in the shaping of human nature, and the more pragmatic (though by no means less important) question of the risks involved in such a novel line of research. As for the first, the claim made here is that in principle there is no constraint in human intervention in the world, since ultimately the source of any value lies in human interests, welfare, and values. This is an approach that is opposite to Habermas's. As for the practical problem of risk, research in synthetic biology calls for particular caution, since in at least the first stages of a new research or program, there is no social regulation, and society is wholly dependent on the scientist's ethical integrity.
合成生物学并未制造出任何在基因筛查、基因工程以及进化过程中的其他干预措施等实践发展中未曾出现过的伦理困境。然而,这个问题在伦理层面上依然很严峻。我们将审视两个不同的角度:人类干预塑造人性的哲学合理性,以及这一全新研究领域所涉及风险的更为务实(尽管绝非不重要)的问题。至于第一个角度,这里所主张的是,原则上人类对世界的干预不存在限制,因为最终任何价值的源泉都在于人类的利益、福祉和价值观。这是一种与哈贝马斯的观点相反的方法。至于风险的实际问题,合成生物学研究需要格外谨慎,因为至少在新研究或项目的最初阶段,不存在社会监管,社会完全依赖于科学家的道德操守。