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An ESS-analysis for ensembles of prisoner's dilemma strategies.

作者信息

Borstnik B, Pumpernik D, Hofacker I L, Hofacker G L

机构信息

Boris Kidrić Institute of Chemistry, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia.

出版信息

J Theor Biol. 1990 Jan 23;142(2):189-200. doi: 10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80221-8.

DOI:10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80221-8
PMID:2352432
Abstract

The ESS (Evolutionary Stable Strategy) concept of Maynard Smith can be applied in its weak form to ensembles of competing PD ("Prisoner's Dilemma") strategies memorizing two to three of one's own and one's opponent's moves. The format of our study is: (1) games have very long duration; (2) Taylor-Jonker dynamics applies; (3) Effects of finite population size can be ignored. It is shown that in the case R greater than (T + S)/2 a set of strategies can be singled out which do not lose against any other strategy while co-operating with themselves. Such a set is uninvadable by other PD strategies if it constitutes more than half of the total population.

摘要

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