Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland OH 44106, USA.
Am J Bioeth. 2013;13(6):38-45. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2013.781703.
Although excess blood collection has characterized U.S. national disasters, most dramatically in the case of September 11, periodic shortages of blood have recurred for decades. In response, I propose a new model of medical philanthropy, one that specifically uses charitable contributions to health care as blood donation incentives. I explain how the surge in blood donations following 9/11 was both transient and disaster-specific, failing to foster a greater continuing commitment to donate blood. This underscores the importance of considering blood donation incentives. I defend charitable incentives as an alternative to financial incentives, which I contend would further extend neoliberal market values into health care. I explain my model's potential appeal to private foundations or public-private partnerships as a means for expanding both the pool of blood donors and the prosocial benefit of each act of blood donation. Finally I link my analysis to the empirical literature on blood donation incentives.
尽管美国的国家灾难经常出现血液采集过多的情况，最显著的例子是 9·11 事件，但几十年来血液周期性短缺的情况也时有发生。有鉴于此，我提出了一种新的医学慈善模式，即特别利用医疗慈善捐款作为献血激励。我解释了 9·11 事件后献血量的激增为何是短暂的、仅限于灾难本身的，并且未能促进更大的持续献血承诺。这凸显了考虑献血激励的重要性。我为慈善激励辩护，认为这是对经济激励的一种替代，因为经济激励会将新自由主义市场价值观进一步扩展到医疗保健领域。我解释了我的模型对私人基金会或公私合作伙伴关系的潜在吸引力，因为这是扩大献血者群体和提高每次献血的亲社会效益的一种手段。最后，我将我的分析与关于献血激励的实证文献联系起来。
