Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles 90095-1481, USA.
Psychol Sci. 2013 Aug;24(8):1512-22. doi: 10.1177/0956797612474471. Epub 2013 Jun 13.
Companies often provide incentives for employees to maintain healthy lifestyles. These incentives can take the form of either discounted premiums for healthy-weight employees ("carrot" policies) or increased premiums for overweight employees ("stick" policies). In the three studies reported here, we demonstrated that even when stick and carrot policies are formally equivalent, they do not necessarily convey the same information to employees. Stick but not carrot policies were viewed as reflecting negative company attitudes toward overweight employees (Study 1a) and were evaluated especially negatively by overweight participants (Study 1b). This was true even when overweight employees paid less money under the stick than under the carrot policy. When acting as policymakers (Study 2), participants with high levels of implicit overweight bias were especially likely to choose stick policies-often on the grounds that such policies were cost-effective-even when doing so was more costly to the company. Policymakers should realize that the framing of incentive programs can convey tacit, and sometimes stigmatizing, messages.
公司经常为员工提供激励措施,以鼓励他们保持健康的生活方式。这些激励措施可以采取为健康体重员工提供折扣保费的形式(“胡萝卜”政策),也可以采取为超重员工增加保费的形式(“大棒”政策)。在本文报告的三项研究中,我们证明了即使“大棒”和“胡萝卜”政策在形式上是等效的,它们并不一定向员工传达相同的信息。“大棒”而非“胡萝卜”政策被视为反映了公司对超重员工的负面态度(研究 1a),并且受到超重参与者的特别负面评价(研究 1b)。即使超重员工在“大棒”政策下支付的钱比在“胡萝卜”政策下少,也是如此。当作为决策者(研究 2)时,具有较高隐性超重偏见的参与者特别有可能选择“大棒”政策——通常是因为这些政策具有成本效益——即使这样做对公司的成本更高。政策制定者应该意识到激励计划的框架可以传达隐性的、有时是污名化的信息。