Colgate University, Department of Philosophy, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, NY 13346-1398, United States.
Schizophr Res. 2014 Jan;152(1):28-32. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2013.06.031. Epub 2013 Jul 6.
There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split the first factor (1 above) into two factors: how abnormal experience can give rise to a delusional 'proto-hypothesis' and how a 'proto-hypothesis' in consort with normal experiences and background information, can be developed into a delusional hypothesis. In particular I will argue that a schizophrenic is faced with the unusual requirement of having to identify an introspectively accessible thought as one's own, and that this requirement of identification is the central experiential abnormality of thought insertion, auditory verbal hallucination, and alien control (i.e. passivity symptoms). Additionally, I will consider non-experiential factors which are required for the formation of a delusional hypothesis.
最近有人强调要对单一主题妄想提供双因素解释。这样的解释将解释 (1) 妄想假设（例如，别人正在将想法插入我的头脑中）如何可以被理解为对经验的表面合理反应，以及 (2) 为什么尽管这种妄想假设不合理且有证据反对，但仍有人相信并坚持这种假设。我认为，如果我们要避免混淆单一主题妄想形成所涉及的认知机制，我们应该将第一个因素（上述 1）分为两个因素：异常经验如何导致妄想“原假设”，以及“原假设”如何与正常经验和背景信息一起发展成妄想假设。特别是，我将论证精神分裂症患者面临着一个不寻常的要求，即必须将一个内省可及的思想识别为自己的思想，而这种识别要求是思想插入、听觉言语幻觉和外来控制（即被动症状）的核心体验异常。此外，我将考虑形成妄想假设所需的非体验因素。
