Brain Language Laboratory, Freie Universität Berlin, 14195 Berlin, Germany; Medical Research Council, Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge CB2 7EF, UK.
Brain Lang. 2013 Oct;127(1):86-103. doi: 10.1016/j.bandl.2013.05.015. Epub 2013 Aug 8.
"Embodied" proposals claim that the meaning of at least some words, concepts and constructions is grounded in knowledge about actions and objects. An alternative "disembodied" position locates semantics in a symbolic system functionally detached from sensorimotor modules. This latter view is not tenable theoretically and has been empirically falsified by neuroscience research. A minimally-embodied approach now claims that action-perception systems may "color", but not represent, meaning; however, such minimal embodiment (misembodiment?) still fails to explain why action and perception systems exert causal effects on the processing of symbols from specific semantic classes. Action perception theory (APT) offers neurobiological mechanisms for "embodied" referential, affective and action semantics along with "disembodied" mechanisms of semantic abstraction, generalization and symbol combination, which draw upon multimodal brain systems. In this sense, APT suggests integrative-neuromechanistic explanations of why both sensorimotor and multimodal areas of the human brain differentially contribute to specific facets of meaning and concepts.
“具身”观点认为，至少某些词汇、概念和结构的意义源于对动作和物体的知识。而另一种“非具身”观点则将语义定位在与感觉运动模块功能分离的符号系统中。后一种观点在理论上站不住脚，也已被神经科学研究的经验证据所否定。现在有一种“低度具身”的观点声称，动作感知系统可能会“影响”语义，但不能“代表”语义；然而，这种最低程度的具身（或错误具身？）仍然无法解释为什么动作和感知系统会对特定语义类别的符号处理产生因果影响。动作感知理论 (APT) 为“具身”的指涉、情感和动作语义提供了神经生物学机制，以及“非具身”的语义抽象、泛化和符号组合机制，这些机制都依赖于多模态的大脑系统。从这个意义上说，APT 为为什么人类大脑的感觉运动和多模态区域会对意义和概念的特定方面做出不同的贡献提供了综合神经机制解释。
