Veterinary and Public Health Group, Royal Veterinary College, Hawkshead Lane, North Mymms, Hertfordshire AL9 7TA, UK.
Prev Vet Med. 2013 Nov 1;112(3-4):248-56. doi: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2013.08.007. Epub 2013 Aug 27.
Now that we are in the rinderpest post-eradication era, attention is focused on the risk of re-introduction. A semi-quantitative risk assessment identified accidental use of rinderpest virus in laboratories as the most likely cause of re-introduction. However there is little data available on the rates of laboratory biosafety breakdowns in general. In addition, any predictions based on past events are subject to various uncertainties. The aims of this study were therefore to investigate the potential usefulness of historical data for predicting the future risk of rinderpest release via laboratory biosafety breakdowns, and to investigate the impacts of the various uncertainties on these predictions. Data were collected using a worldwide online survey of laboratories, a structured search of ProMED reports and discussion with experts. A stochastic model was constructed to predict the number of laboratory biosafety breakdowns involving rinderpest that will occur over the next 10 years, based on: (1) the historical rate of biosafety breakdowns; and (2) the change in the number of laboratories that will have rinderpest virus in the next 10 years compared to historically. The search identified five breakdowns, all of which occurred during 1970-2000 and all of which were identified via discussions with experts. Assuming that our search for historical events had a sensitivity of over 60% and there has been at least a 40% reduction in the underlying risk (attributable to decreased laboratory activity post eradication) the most likely number of biosafety events worldwide was estimated to be zero over a 10 year period. However, the risk of at least one biosafety breakdown remains greater than 1 in 10,000 unless the sensitivity was at least 99% or the number of laboratories has decreased by at least 99% (based on 2000-2010 during which there were no biosafety breakdowns).
既然我们已经进入了牛瘟根除后时代,那么关注的焦点就放在了重新引入的风险上。一项半定量风险评估确定,实验室中意外使用牛瘟病毒是重新引入的最可能原因。然而,一般来说,关于实验室生物安全故障的发生率的数据很少。此外,任何基于过去事件的预测都受到各种不确定性的影响。因此,本研究的目的是调查历史数据在预测未来通过实验室生物安全故障释放牛瘟的风险方面的潜在有用性,并调查各种不确定性对这些预测的影响。数据是通过对实验室的全球在线调查、对 ProMED 报告的结构化搜索以及与专家的讨论收集的。基于以下两个方面,构建了一个随机模型来预测未来 10 年内实验室生物安全故障涉及牛瘟的数量:(1)生物安全故障的历史发生率;(2)未来 10 年内具有牛瘟病毒的实验室数量与历史上相比的变化。搜索确定了五起故障,其中四起发生在 1970 年至 2000 年期间,所有这些故障都是通过与专家讨论确定的。假设我们对历史事件的搜索敏感性超过 60%,并且潜在风险至少降低了 40%(归因于根除后实验室活动减少),那么在未来 10 年内,全球范围内最有可能的生物安全事件数量估计为零。然而,除非敏感性至少为 99%,或者实验室数量至少减少 99%(基于 2000 年至 2010 年期间没有生物安全故障),否则至少发生一次生物安全故障的风险仍然大于万分之一。