Bornemark Jonna
School of Culture and Learning, Center for Practical Knowledge, Södertörn University, 141 89, Huddinge, Sweden,
Med Health Care Philos. 2014 May;17(2):259-68. doi: 10.1007/s11019-013-9508-y.
In phenomenology, theories of empathy are intimately connected with the question of how it is possible to have insight into the mind of the other person. In this article, the author wants to show why it is self-evident for us that the other person is having experiences. In order to do so, it is not enough to discuss the phenomenon of empathy with a starting point in the already constituted adult person; instead the article presents a genetic approach to human development. The author thus contrasts Edith Stein's discussion of Einfühlung (empathy), which takes its starting point in the experience of the grown-up, with Max Scheler's discussion of Einsfühlung (feeling of oneness), where the relation between mother and infant is taken as one example. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the world of the infant is read as one way of developing Scheler's theory of intersubjectivity and of Einsfühlung. This genetic approach is developed further into a phenomenological analysis of the experience of the fetus and of birth. The author argues that the analysis of the fetus highlights the distinction between knowing that another person is having experiences, and knowing the specific content of the other person's experiences. The fetus does not experience different persons, but has a pre-subjective experience of life that includes what is later experienced as belonging to "another." Later in life, the experience of empathy, as an experience of a specific content, can be developed from this experience. In this way empathy and Einsfühlung can be understood as complementary rather than as competing phenomena.
在现象学中，移情理论与洞察他人内心如何成为可能这一问题紧密相连。在本文中，作者想要说明为何对我们而言他人正在经历体验是不言而喻的。为了做到这一点，仅从已然成年的个体出发去讨论移情现象是不够的；相反，本文呈现了一种关于人类发展的发生学方法。因此，作者将以成年人的体验为出发点对“Einfühlung”（移情）展开讨论的艾迪特·施泰因，与以母婴关系为例讨论“Einsfühlung”（合一感）的马克斯·舍勒进行了对比。莫里斯·梅洛 - 庞蒂对婴儿世界的讨论被解读为发展舍勒主体间性理论及合一感理论的一种方式。这种发生学方法进一步发展为对胎儿体验和出生体验的现象学分析。作者认为，对胎儿的分析凸显了知晓他人正在经历体验与知晓他人体验的具体内容之间的区别。胎儿并未体验不同的人，而是有一种前主观的生命体验，其中包括后来被体验为属于“他人”的东西。在生命后期，作为对特定内容体验的移情体验可以从这种体验中发展而来。通过这种方式，移情与合一感可被理解为互补而非相互竞争的现象。
