Paul Elisabeth, Samaké Salif, Berthé Issa, Huijts Ini, Balique Hubert, Dujardin Bruno
Université de Liège, Changement Social et Développement, and Research Group on the Implementation of the Agenda for Aid Effectiveness in the Health Sector (GRAP-PA Santé), Boulevard du Rectorat 7, Bât B31, bte 8, 4000 Liège, Belgium, Planning and Statistics Unit, Ministry of Health, BP232, Koulouba, Bamako, Mali, International Heath Expert, Bamako, Mali, Laboratoire de Santé Publique, Faculté de Médecine de Marseille 27, Bd Jean Moulin, 13385 Marseille CEDEX 05, France and Ecole de Santé Publique, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Campus Erasme, CP596, Route de Lennik 808, 1070 Bruxelles, Belgium
Université de Liège, Changement Social et Développement, and Research Group on the Implementation of the Agenda for Aid Effectiveness in the Health Sector (GRAP-PA Santé), Boulevard du Rectorat 7, Bât B31, bte 8, 4000 Liège, Belgium, Planning and Statistics Unit, Ministry of Health, BP232, Koulouba, Bamako, Mali, International Heath Expert, Bamako, Mali, Laboratoire de Santé Publique, Faculté de Médecine de Marseille 27, Bd Jean Moulin, 13385 Marseille CEDEX 05, France and Ecole de Santé Publique, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Campus Erasme, CP596, Route de Lennik 808, 1070 Bruxelles, Belgium.
Health Policy Plan. 2014 Dec;29(8):1071-4. doi: 10.1093/heapol/czt082. Epub 2013 Nov 6.
Mali has long been a leader in francophone Africa in developing systems aimed at improving aid effectiveness, especially in the health sector. But following the invasion of the Northern regions of the country by terrorist groups and a coup in March 2012, donors suspended official development assistance, except for support to NGOs and humanitarian assistance. They resumed aid after transfer of power to a civil government, but this was not done in a harmonized framework. This article describes and analyses how donors in the health sector reacted to the political unrest in Mali. It shows that despite its long sector-wide approach experience and international agreements to respect aid effectiveness principles, donors have not been able to intervene in view of safeguarding the investments of co-operation in the past decade, and of protecting the health system's functioning. They reacted to the political unrest on a bilateral basis, stopped working with their ministerial partners, interrupted support to the health system which was still expected to serve populations' needs and took months before organizing alternative and only partial solutions to resume aid to the health sector. The Malian example leads to a worrying conclusion: while protecting the health system's achievements and functioning for the population should be a priority, and while harmonizing donors' interventions seems the most appropriate way for that purpose, donors' management practices do not allow for reacting adequately in times of unrest. The article concludes by a number of recommendations.
长期以来,马里一直是法语非洲国家中发展旨在提高援助实效的体系的领导者,尤其是在卫生领域。但在该国北部地区遭受恐怖组织入侵以及2012年3月发生政变后,除了对非政府组织的支持和人道主义援助外,捐助方暂停了官方发展援助。在权力移交给文职政府后,他们恢复了援助,但这并非在一个协调一致的框架内进行。本文描述并分析了卫生领域的捐助方如何应对马里的政治动荡。结果表明,尽管马里长期以来有全部门方法的经验,且有尊重援助实效原则的国际协定,但捐助方未能进行干预,以保障过去十年的合作投资,并保护卫生系统的运转。他们以双边方式应对政治动荡,停止与部长级伙伴合作,中断对仍需满足民众需求的卫生系统的支持,且在数月后才组织替代方案,且只是部分恢复对卫生部门的援助。马里的例子得出了一个令人担忧的结论:虽然保护卫生系统为民众取得的成就及其运转应是优先事项,而且协调捐助方的干预似乎是实现这一目标的最合适方式,但捐助方的管理做法在动荡时期无法做出充分反应。文章最后提出了一些建议。