Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.
Global Health. 2013 Nov 7;9:58. doi: 10.1186/1744-8603-9-58.
Antimicrobial resistance is a growing threat resulting from the convergence of biological, economic and political pressures. Investment in research and development of new antimicrobials has suffered secondary to these pressures, leading to an emerging crisis in antibiotic resistance.
Current policies to stimulate antibiotic development have proven inadequate to overcome market failures. Therefore innovative ideas utilizing market forces are necessary to stimulate new investment efforts. Employing the benefits of both the previously described Advanced Market Commitment and a refined Call Options for Vaccines model, we describe herein a novel incentive mechanism, the Options Market for Antibiotics.
This model applies the benefits of a financial call option to the investment in and purchase of new antibiotics. The goal of this new model is to provide an effective mechanism for early investment and risk sharing while maintaining a credible purchase commitment and incentives for companies to ultimately bring new antibiotics to market.
We believe that the Options Market for Antibiotics (OMA) may help to overcome some of the traditional market failures associated with the development of new antibiotics. Additional work must be done to develop a more robust mathematical model to pave the way for practical implementation.
抗菌药物耐药性是由生物、经济和政治压力共同作用导致的日益严重的威胁。由于这些压力,新型抗菌药物的研发投资受到影响,导致抗生素耐药性出现新的危机。
目前刺激抗生素开发的政策已被证明不足以克服市场失灵。因此,需要利用市场力量的创新理念来刺激新的投资。我们借鉴先前描述的高级市场承诺和改进的疫苗期权模型的优势,在此描述了一种新颖的激励机制,即抗生素期权市场。
该模型将金融看涨期权的优势应用于新型抗生素的投资和采购。该模型的目标是提供一种有效的早期投资和风险分担机制,同时保持对公司的可信采购承诺和激励,最终使新型抗生素推向市场。
我们认为,抗生素期权市场(OMA)可能有助于克服与新型抗生素开发相关的一些传统市场失灵。需要进一步开展工作,以开发更稳健的数学模型,为实际实施铺平道路。