Renwick Matthew J, Brogan David M, Mossialos Elias
LSE Health, Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Missouri Orthopaedic Institute, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA.
J Antibiot (Tokyo). 2016 Feb;69(2):73-88. doi: 10.1038/ja.2015.98. Epub 2015 Oct 14.
Despite the growing threat of antimicrobial resistance, pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms are reluctant to develop novel antibiotics because of a host of market failures. This problem is complicated by public health goals that demand antibiotic conservation and equitable patient access. Thus, an innovative incentive strategy is needed to encourage sustainable investment in antibiotics. This systematic review consolidates, classifies and critically assesses a total of 47 proposed incentives. Given the large number of possible strategies, a decision framework is presented to assist with the selection of incentives. This framework focuses on addressing market failures that result in limited investment, public health priorities regarding antibiotic stewardship and patient access, and implementation constraints and operational realities. The flexible nature of this framework allows policy makers to tailor an antibiotic incentive package that suits a country's health system structure and needs.
尽管抗菌药物耐药性的威胁日益增加,但由于一系列市场失灵问题,制药和生物技术公司不愿研发新型抗生素。公共卫生目标要求节约使用抗生素并确保患者公平获得药物,这使得问题更加复杂。因此,需要一种创新的激励策略来鼓励对抗生素进行可持续投资。本系统综述汇总、分类并严格评估了总共47种拟议的激励措施。鉴于可能的策略数量众多,本文提出了一个决策框架,以协助选择激励措施。该框架侧重于解决导致投资有限的市场失灵问题、抗生素管理和患者获得药物方面的公共卫生优先事项,以及实施限制和运营现实情况。该框架的灵活性使政策制定者能够制定适合一个国家卫生系统结构和需求的抗生素激励方案。