Frank David
Environmental Studies, Center for Bioethics, New York University, 285 Mercer St. #908, New York, NY 10003, United States.
Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci. 2014 Mar;45:101-4. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.10.005. Epub 2013 Nov 9.
This paper critically discusses two areas of Sahotra Sarkar's recent work in environmental philosophy: biodiversity and conservation biology and roles for decision theory in incorporating values explicitly in the environmental policy process. I argue that Sarkar's emphasis on the practices of conservation biologists, and especially the role of social and cultural values in the choice of biodiversity constituents, restricts his conception of biodiversity to particular practical conservation contexts. I argue that life scientists have many reasons to measure many types of diversity, and that biodiversity metrics could be value-free. I argue that Sarkar's emphasis on the limitations of normative decision theory is in tension with his statement that decision theory can "put science and ethics together." I also challenge his claim that multi-criteria decision tools lacking axiomatic foundations in preference and utility theory are "without a rational basis," by presenting a case of a simple "outranking" multi-criteria decision rule that can violate a basic normative requirement of preferences (transitivity) and ask whether there may nevertheless be contexts in which such a procedure might assist decision makers.
本文批判性地讨论了萨霍特拉·萨卡尔近期在环境哲学领域的两个工作方向:生物多样性与保护生物学,以及决策理论在将价值观明确纳入环境政策过程中的作用。我认为,萨卡尔对保护生物学家实践的强调,尤其是社会和文化价值观在生物多样性构成要素选择中的作用,将他对生物多样性的概念限制在了特定的实际保护背景中。我认为生命科学家有很多理由去衡量多种类型的多样性,而且生物多样性指标可以是价值中立的。我认为萨卡尔对规范决策理论局限性的强调与他所说的决策理论能够“将科学与伦理结合起来”相矛盾。我还对他的观点提出质疑,即那些在偏好和效用理论中缺乏公理基础的多标准决策工具“没有理性依据”,我通过展示一个简单的“优势”多标准决策规则的案例来进行质疑,该规则可能会违反偏好的一个基本规范要求(传递性),并探讨是否存在这样的情况,即这种程序可能会帮助决策者。