Cornwell James F M, Higgins E Tory
Columbia University, Department of Psychology, 406 Schermerhorn Hall, 1190 Amsterdam Ave. MC 5501, New York, NY 10027.
J Exp Soc Psychol. 2014 Jan;50. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2013.09.007.
Moral Foundations Theory has provided a framework for understanding the endorsement of different moral beliefs. Our research investigated whether there are other reasons to endorse moral foundations in addition to epistemic concerns; specifically, the perceived social of moral foundations. In Study 1, we demonstrate that those showing stronger locomotion concerns for controlling movement tend toward a higher endorsement of binding foundations, and that this effect is stronger among political liberals who otherwise do not typically endorse these foundations. In Study 2, we show that priming participants with assessment concerns (emphasizing truth) rather than locomotion concerns (emphasizing control) reduces the response variance among liberals and also removes the association between locomotion and the binding foundations. In Study 3, we directly ask participants to focus on moral truth versus moral usefulness, with moral truth replicating the Study 2 effect of assessment priming, and moral usefulness replicating the effect of locomotion priming.
道德基础理论为理解不同道德信念的认同提供了一个框架。我们的研究调查了除认知因素外,是否还有其他原因支持道德基础;具体而言,即道德基础的社会认知。在研究1中,我们证明,那些对控制行动表现出更强行动关注的人更倾向于认同约束性基础,而且这种效应在通常不认同这些基础的政治自由主义者中更为强烈。在研究2中,我们表明,用评估关注(强调真理)而非行动关注(强调控制)启动参与者,会减少自由主义者之间的反应差异,也会消除行动与约束性基础之间的关联。在研究3中,我们直接要求参与者关注道德真理与道德有用性,道德真理重现了研究2中评估启动的效果,道德有用性重现了行动启动的效果。