Evolutionary Theory Group and Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2014 Jan 14;111(2):752-6. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1315273111. Epub 2013 Dec 23.
Individuals usually punish free riders but refuse to sanction those who cooperate but do not punish. This missing second-order peer punishment is a fundamental problem for the stabilization of cooperation. To solve this problem, most societies today have implemented central authorities that punish free riders and tax evaders alike, such that second-order punishment is fully established. The emergence of such stable authorities from individual decisions, however, creates a new paradox: it seems absurd to expect individuals who do not engage in second-order punishment to strive for an authority that does. Herein, we provide a mathematical model and experimental results from a public goods game where subjects can choose between a community with and without second-order punishment in two different ways. When subjects can migrate continuously to either community, we identify a bias toward institutions that do not punish tax evaders. When subjects have to vote once for all rounds of the game and have to accept the decision of the majority, they prefer a society with second-order punishment. These findings uncover the existence of a democracy premium. The majority-voting rule allows subjects to commit themselves and to implement institutions that eventually lead to a higher welfare for all.
个体通常会惩罚搭便车者，但拒绝制裁那些合作但不惩罚的人。这种缺失的二阶同伴惩罚是合作稳定的一个基本问题。为了解决这个问题，当今大多数社会都实施了中央权威机构，对搭便车者和逃税者一视同仁，从而完全确立了二阶惩罚。然而，这种稳定的权威机构从个体决策中出现，产生了一个新的悖论：期望那些不进行二阶惩罚的个体去争取一个实施二阶惩罚的权威机构，似乎是荒谬的。在本文中，我们提供了一个公共物品博弈的数学模型和实验结果，其中主体可以通过两种不同的方式在有和没有二阶惩罚的社区之间进行选择。当主体可以持续迁移到任何一个社区时，我们发现存在一种偏向于不惩罚逃税者的制度的偏见。当主体必须一次性投票决定所有轮次的游戏，并必须接受多数人的决定时，他们更喜欢有二阶惩罚的社会。这些发现揭示了民主溢价的存在。多数投票规则允许主体做出承诺，并实施最终使所有人福利更高的制度。
