Evolutionary Theory Group, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, D-24306 Plön, Germany.
Sci Rep. 2012;2:458. doi: 10.1038/srep00458. Epub 2012 Jun 13.
While empirical evidence highlights the importance of punishment for cooperation in collective action, it remains disputed how responsible sanctions targeted predominantly at uncooperative subjects can evolve. Punishment is costly; in order to spread it typically requires local interactions, voluntary participation, or rewards. Moreover, theory and experiments indicate that some subjects abuse sanctioning opportunities by engaging in antisocial punishment (which harms cooperators), spiteful acts (harming everyone) or revenge (as a response to being punished). These arguments have led to the conclusion that punishment is maladaptive. Here, we use evolutionary game theory to show that this conclusion is premature: If interactions are non-anonymous, cooperation and punishment evolve even if initially rare, and sanctions are directed towards non-cooperators only. Thus, our willingness to punish free riders is ultimately a selfish decision rather than an altruistic act; punishment serves as a warning, showing that one is not willing to accept unfair treatments.
虽然经验证据强调了惩罚对于合作的重要性，但对于主要针对不合作主体的有责任的制裁如何演变，仍存在争议。惩罚是有代价的；为了传播它，通常需要进行本地交互、自愿参与或奖励。此外，理论和实验表明，一些主体会滥用制裁机会，采取反社会的惩罚（伤害合作者）、恶意行为（伤害所有人）或报复（作为对被惩罚的回应）。这些观点导致了惩罚是不适应的的结论。在这里，我们使用进化博弈论来表明这个结论是不成熟的：如果交互是非匿名的，合作和惩罚即使最初很少见也会进化，而且制裁只针对不合作者。因此，我们惩罚搭便车者的意愿最终是一个自私的决定，而不是利他的行为；惩罚是一种警告，表明一个人不愿意接受不公平的待遇。
