Department of Psychology, Gordon College.
Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2014 Feb;106(2):218-34. doi: 10.1037/a0034662.
Values-pragmatics theory (Hodges & Geyer, 2006) predicts that people will sometimes disagree with others they believe are correct, for reasons similar to those explaining agreement with incorrect answers in an Asch (1956) situation. In 3 experiments, we found evidence that people in a position of ignorance sometimes do not agree with the correct answers of others in positions of knowledge. Experiments 1a and 1b found this speaking-from-ignorance (SFI) effect occurred 27% of the time. Experiment 2 introduced experimental controls and self-report data indicating that the SFI effect (30%) was generated by realizing values (e.g., truth, social solidarity) and pragmatic constraints to act cooperatively, rather than by a wide array of alternatives (e.g., normative pressure, reactance). Experiment 3 experimentally manipulated concern for truthfulness, yielding 49% nonagreeing answers, even though there were monetary incentives to give correct, agreeing answers. The overall pattern suggests that people are not so much conformists or independents as they are cooperative truth tellers under social and moral constraints. Results, while surprising for social influence theories, illustrate the dynamics of divergence and convergence that appear across studies in cultural anthropology and developmental psychology, as well as in social psychology.
价值语用学理论(Hodges & Geyer,2006)预测,人们有时会不同意他们认为正确的人,原因类似于在阿希(Asch,1956)情境中同意错误答案的原因。在 3 项实验中,我们发现了证据,表明处于无知地位的人有时不会同意处于知识地位的他人的正确答案。实验 1a 和 1b 发现这种从无知中发言(SFI)的效果出现了 27%的时间。实验 2 引入了实验控制和自我报告数据,表明 SFI 效应(30%)是由实现价值观(例如,真理、社会团结)和合作的语用约束产生的,而不是由广泛的替代方案(例如,规范性压力、反应性)产生的。实验 3 实验性地操纵了对真实性的关注,产生了 49%的不赞同回答,尽管有金钱激励给予正确的、赞同的回答。总的来说,这表明人们与其说是顺从者或独立者,不如说是在社会和道德约束下的合作性的说实话者。这些结果虽然对社会影响理论来说令人惊讶,但说明了在文化人类学和发展心理学以及社会心理学中出现的分歧和趋同的动态。