a Florida International University.
Am J Bioeth. 2014;14(2):4-12. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2013.868951.
Human-nonhuman chimeras have been the focus of ethical controversies for more than a decade, yet some related issues remain unaddressed. For example, little has been said about the relationship between the origin of transferred cells and the morally relevant capacities to which they may give rise. Consider, for example, a developing mouse fetus that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a human and another that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a dolphin. If both chimeras acquire morally relevant capacities as a result of transplantation, and if those capacities are indistinguishable, should the difference in cell origin matter to how we classify these creatures? I argue that if morally relevant capacities are easy to detect, cell origin is irrelevant to how the chimera ought to be treated. However, if such capacities are hard to detect, cell origin should play a role in considerations about how to treat the chimera.
人类-非人类嵌合体已经成为伦理争议的焦点超过十年，但仍有一些相关问题未得到解决。例如，关于被转移细胞的起源与它们可能产生的道德相关能力之间的关系，几乎没有什么说法。例如，考虑一个接受来自人类的脑干细胞移植的发育中的老鼠胎儿，和另一个接受来自海豚的脑干细胞移植的老鼠胎儿。如果两个嵌合体都因移植而获得了道德相关的能力，并且这些能力无法区分，那么细胞起源的差异是否会影响我们对这些生物的分类？我认为，如果道德相关的能力很容易被发现，那么细胞起源与如何对待嵌合体无关。然而，如果这些能力很难被发现，那么细胞起源应该在考虑如何对待嵌合体时发挥作用。
