Foddy Bennett, Savulescu Julian
Philos Psychiatr Psychol. 2010 Mar 1;17(1):1-22. doi: 10.1353/ppp.0.0282.
Philosophers and psychologists have been attracted to two differing accounts of addictive motivation. In this paper, we investigate these two accounts and challenge their mutual claim that addictions compromise a person's self-control. First, we identify some incompatibilities between this claim of reduced self-control and the available evidence from various disciplines. A critical assessment of the evidence weakens the empirical argument for reduced autonomy. Second, we identify sources of unwarranted normative bias in the popular theories of addiction that introduce systematic errors in interpreting the evidence. By eliminating these errors, we are able to generate a minimal, but correct account, of addiction that presumes addicts to be autonomous in their addictive behavior, absent further evidence to the contrary. Finally, we explore some of the implications of this minimal, correct view.
哲学家和心理学家一直被两种关于成瘾动机的不同观点所吸引。在本文中，我们研究这两种观点，并对它们共同声称成瘾会损害一个人的自我控制能力提出质疑。首先，我们指出这种自我控制能力下降的说法与来自各学科的现有证据之间存在一些不相容之处。对证据的批判性评估削弱了自主性降低的实证论据。其次，我们找出成瘾流行理论中存在无端规范偏见的根源，这些偏见在解释证据时引入了系统性错误。通过消除这些错误，我们能够得出一个关于成瘾的最小化但正确的观点，即在没有进一步相反证据的情况下，假定成瘾者在其成瘾行为中是自主的。最后，我们探讨了这种最小化的正确观点的一些含义。
