Häyry Matti
Bioethics. 2014 May;28(4):170-3. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12094.
Academic freedom can be defined as immunity against adverse reactions from the general public, designed to keep scholars unintimidated and productive even after they have published controversial ideas. Francesca Minerva claims that this notion of strict instrumental academic freedom is supported by Ronald Dworkin, and that anonymity would effectively defend the sphere of immunity implied by it. Against this, I argue that the idea defended by Minerva finds no support in the work by Dworkin referred to; that anonymity would not in most cases effectively protect the kind of immunity sought after; and that in some cases it would not even be desirable to protect scholars from public reactions to their controversial claims.
学术自由可以被定义为免受公众不良反应影响的豁免权，其目的是让学者即使在发表了有争议的观点之后也不会受到恐吓，并能保持高效的工作状态。弗朗西斯卡·米内尔瓦声称，这种严格的工具性学术自由概念得到了罗纳德·德沃金的支持，并且匿名将有效地捍卫其隐含的豁免领域。与此相反，我认为米内尔瓦所捍卫的观点在她所提及的德沃金的著作中并未得到支持；匿名在大多数情况下并不能有效地保护所追求的那种豁免权；而且在某些情况下，甚至不应该保护学者免受公众对其有争议主张的反应。
