Cornell Law Rev. 2014;99(3):513-69.
The ability of government to "nudge" with information mandates, or merely to inform consumers of risks, is circumscribed by First Amendment interests that have been poorly articulated. New graphic cigarette warning labels supplied courts with the first opportunity to assess the informational interests attending novel forms of product disclosures. The D.C. Circuit enjoined them as unconstitutional, compelled by a narrative that the graphic labels converted government from objective informer to ideological persuader, shouting its warning to manipulate consumer decisions. This interpretation will leave little room for graphic disclosure and is already being used to challenge textual disclosure requirements (such as county-of-origin labeling) as unconstitutional. Graphic warning and the increasing reliance on regulation-by-disclosure present new free speech quandaries related to consumer autonomy, state normativity, and speaker liberty. This Article examines the distinct goals of product disclosure requirements and how those goals may serve to vindicate, or to frustrate, listener interests. I argue that many disclosures, and especially warnings, are necessarily both normative and informative, expressing value along with fact. It is not the existence of a norm that raises constitutional concern but rather the insistence on a controversial norm. Turning to the means of disclosure, this Article examines how emotional and graphic communication might change the constitutional calculus. Using autonomy theory and the communications research on speech processing, I conclude that disclosures do not bypass reason simply by reaching for the heart. If large graphic labels are unconstitutional, it will be because of undue burden on the speaker, not because they are emotionally powerful. This Article makes the following distinct contributions to the compelled commercial speech literature: critiques the leading precedent, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, from a consumer autonomy standpoint; brings to bear empirical communications research on questions of facticity and rationality in emotional and graphic communications; and teases apart and distinguishes among various free speech dangers and contributions of commercial disclosure mandates with a view towards informing policy, law, and research.
政府“推动”信息授权，或者仅仅告知消费者风险的能力，受到第一修正案利益的限制，这些利益没有得到很好的阐述。新的图形香烟警告标签为法院提供了评估新产品披露伴随的信息利益的第一个机会。哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院禁止使用这些标签，认为它们违反宪法，因为图形标签将政府从客观的信息提供者转变为意识形态的说服者，大声警告以操纵消费者的决定。这种解释几乎没有为图形披露留下空间，并且已经被用来质疑文本披露要求（如原产国标签）是否违反宪法。图形警告和越来越依赖监管披露，给消费者自主权、国家规范性和演讲者自由带来了新的言论自由困境。本文探讨了产品披露要求的不同目标，以及这些目标如何为听众利益提供辩护或造成阻碍。我认为，许多披露，特别是警告，既是规范性的，也是信息性的，既表达了事实，也表达了价值观。引起宪法关注的不是规范性的存在，而是对有争议的规范性的坚持。本文转而探讨披露的方式，考察情感和图形交流如何改变宪法的计算。利用自主性理论和关于演讲处理的传播研究，我得出的结论是，披露不会仅仅通过诉诸情感就绕过理性。如果大的图形标签是违宪的，那将是因为对演讲者造成了不当负担，而不是因为它们具有强烈的情感力量。本文对强制性商业言论文献做出了以下独特贡献：从消费者自主权的角度批判了主要的先例，即 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel；借鉴了关于情感和图形交流中真实性和理性的实证传播研究；并梳理和区分了商业披露授权的各种言论自由危险和贡献，以期为政策、法律和研究提供信息。
