Jeong Hyeong-Chai, Oh Seung-Yoon, Allen Benjamin, Nowak Martin A
Department of Physics, Sejong University, Gangjingu, Seoul 143-747, Republic of Korea; Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 20138, USA.
Department of Physics, Sejong University, Gangjingu, Seoul 143-747, Republic of Korea.
J Theor Biol. 2014 Sep 7;356:98-112. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.04.025. Epub 2014 Apr 26.
We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition, there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by adopting loner strategies. Optional games lead to relaxed social dilemmas. Here we explore the interaction between spatial structure and optional games. We find that increasing the number of loner strategies (or equivalently increasing mutational bias toward loner strategies) facilitates evolution of cooperation both in well-mixed and in structured populations. We derive various limits for weak selection and large population size. For some cases we derive analytic results for strong selection. We also analyze strategy selection numerically for finite selection intensity and discuss combined effects of optionality and spatial structure.
我们研究简单图上可选博弈的随机演化。存在两种策略，A和B，它们之间的相互作用由一个通用收益矩阵描述。此外，存在一种或几种通过采用孤立策略退出博弈的可能性。可选博弈导致了宽松的社会困境。在此我们探究空间结构与可选博弈之间的相互作用。我们发现增加孤立策略的数量（或者等效地增加向孤立策略的突变偏差）会促进合作在完全混合和结构化种群中的演化。我们推导了弱选择和大种群规模下的各种极限情况。对于某些情况，我们推导了强选择的解析结果。我们还针对有限选择强度进行了策略选择的数值分析，并讨论了可选性和空间结构的综合影响。
