Li Yang, Yamagishi Toshio
Shinrigaku Kenkyu. 2014 Apr;85(1):100-5. doi: 10.4992/jjpsy.85.100.
The strong reciprocity model of human cooperation (SRM) argues that strong reciprocators, who cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, sustain within-group cooperation. However, the assumption that altruism and punishment are products of the same psychological mechanism of strong reciprocity has not been fully verified. Second-party punishment, for example as measured through rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game, has been demonstrated to have no relationship with cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and other games. In this study, we tested the assumption of the SRM by comparing the participants' levels of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game and their inclination for punishment in a third-party punishment game. Non-student recruited from the general population (N = 182) participated in the study. The results show a weak but positive correlation between cooperation and third-party punishment, which is consistent with the SRM model.
人类合作的强互惠模型（SRM）认为，强互惠者会与他人合作并惩罚不合作者，从而维持群体内的合作。然而，利他主义和惩罚是由强互惠这同一心理机制产生的这一假设尚未得到充分验证。例如，通过最后通牒博弈中对不公平提议的拒绝来衡量的第二方惩罚，已被证明与囚徒困境及其他博弈中的合作无关。在本研究中，我们通过比较参与者在囚徒困境博弈中的合作水平以及他们在第三方惩罚博弈中的惩罚倾向，来检验SRM的假设。从普通人群中招募的非学生参与者（N = 182）参与了本研究。结果显示，合作与第三方惩罚之间存在微弱但积极的相关性，这与SRM模型一致。
