Douglas Thomas
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St Ebbes St, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK.
Ethical Theory Moral Pract. 2014 Apr 1;17(2):325-334. doi: 10.1007/s10677-013-9441-4.
Kelly Sorensen defends a model of the relationship between effort and moral worth in which the effort exerted in performing a morally desirable action contributes positively to the action's moral worth, but the effort required to perform the action detracts from its moral worth. I argue that Sorensen's model, though on the right track, is mistaken in three ways. First, it fails to capture the relevance of counterfactual effort to moral worth. Second, it wrongly implies that exerting unnecessary effort confers moral worth on an action. Third, it fails to adequately distinguish between cases in which effort is required because of defects of moral character and those in which effort is required because of barriers external to moral character, such as social pressures or non-moral cognitive deficits. I suggest three amendments to Sorensen's model that correct these three defects.
凯利·索伦森为努力与道德价值之间的关系辩护了一种模型，在这种模型中，实施道德上可取的行为时所付出的努力对该行为的道德价值有积极贡献，但实施该行为所需的努力会减损其道德价值。我认为，索伦森的模型虽然方向正确，但在三个方面存在错误。第一，它没有抓住反事实努力与道德价值的相关性。第二，它错误地暗示付出不必要的努力会赋予一个行为道德价值。第三，它没有充分区分因道德品质缺陷而需要努力的情况和因道德品质之外的障碍（如社会压力或非道德认知缺陷）而需要努力的情况。我对索伦森的模型提出了三项修正，以纠正这三个缺陷。
