Jayaraman Sudha P, Klompas Michael, Bascom Molli, Liu Xiaoxia, Piszcz Regina, Rogers Selwyn O, Askari Reza
1 Department of Surgery, Brigham and Women's Hospital/Harvard Medical School , Boston, Massachusetts.
Surg Infect (Larchmt). 2014 Oct;15(5):533-9. doi: 10.1089/sur.2013.128. Epub 2014 Sep 12.
Our institution had a major outbreak of multi-drug-resistant Acinetobacter (MDRA) in its general surgical and trauma intensive care units (ICUs) in 2011, requiring implementation of an aggressive infection-control response. We hypothesized that poor hand-hygiene compliance (HHC) may have contributed to the outbreak of MDRA. A response to the outbreak including aggressive environmental cleaning, cohorting, and increased hand hygiene compliance monitoring may have led to an increase in HHC after the outbreak and to a consequent decrease in the rates of infection by the nosocomial pathogens methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), and Clostridium difficile.
Hand-hygiene compliance, tracked in monthly audits by trained and anonymous observers, was abstracted from an infection control database. The incidences of nosocomial MRSA, VRE, and C. difficile were calculated from a separate prospectively collected data base for 6 mo before and 12 mo after the 2011 outbreak of MDRA in the institution's general surgical and trauma ICUs, and data collected prospectively from two unaffected ICUs (the thoracic surgical ICU and medical intensive care unit [MICU]). We created a composite endpoint of "any resistant pathogen," defined as MRSA, VRE, or C. difficile, and compared incidence rates over time, using the Wilcoxon signed rank test and Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient to measure the correlations among these rates.
Rates of HHC before and after the outbreak of MDRA were consistently high in both the general surgical (median rates: 100% before and 97.6% after the outbreak, p=0.93) and trauma ICUs (median rates: 90% before and 96.75% after the outbreak, p=0.14). In none of the ICUs included in the study did the rates of HHC increase in response to the outbreak of MDRA. The incidence of "any resistant pathogen" decreased in the general surgical ICU after the outbreak (from 6.7/1,000 patient-days before the outbreak to 2.7/1,000 patient-days after the outbreak, p=0.04), but this decrease did not correlate with HHC (trauma ICU: Pearson correlation [ρ]=-0.34, p=0.28; general surgical ICU: ρ=0.52, p=0.08).
The 2011 outbreak of MDRA at our institution occurred despite high rates of HHC. Notwithstanding stable rates of HHC, the rates of infection with MRSA, VRE and C. difficile decreased in the general surgical ICU after the outbreak. This suggests that infection control tactics other than HHC play a crucial role in preventing the transmission of nosocomial pathogens, especially when rates of HHC have been maximized.
2011年,我们机构的普通外科和创伤重症监护病房(ICU)发生了多药耐药不动杆菌(MDRA)的大规模暴发,需要采取积极的感染控制应对措施。我们推测手部卫生依从性差(HHC)可能是MDRA暴发的原因之一。对此次暴发的应对措施包括积极的环境清洁、分组护理以及加强手部卫生依从性监测,这些措施可能导致暴发后HHC有所提高,进而使耐甲氧西林金黄色葡萄球菌(MRSA)、耐万古霉素肠球菌(VRE)和艰难梭菌等医院病原体的感染率下降。
由经过培训的匿名观察员每月进行审计来追踪手部卫生依从性,数据取自感染控制数据库。医院普通外科和创伤ICU在2011年MDRA暴发前6个月和暴发后12个月,以及从两个未受影响的ICU(胸外科ICU和内科重症监护病房[MICU])前瞻性收集的数据中,计算医院获得性MRSA、VRE和艰难梭菌的发病率。我们创建了一个“任何耐药病原体”的复合终点,定义为MRSA、VRE或艰难梭菌,并使用Wilcoxon符号秩检验和Pearson积矩相关系数来比较不同时间的发病率,以衡量这些发病率之间的相关性。
在普通外科ICU(中位数:暴发前100%,暴发后97.6%,p = 0.93)和创伤ICU(中位数:暴发前90%,暴发后96.75%,p = 0.14)中,MDRA暴发前后的HHC率一直很高。在纳入研究的所有ICU中,HHC率均未因MDRA暴发而升高。普通外科ICU暴发后“任何耐药病原体”的发病率有所下降(从暴发前的6.7/1000患者日降至暴发后的2.7/1000患者日,p = 0.04),但这种下降与HHC无关(创伤ICU:Pearson相关系数[ρ]= -0.34,p = 0.28;普通外科ICU:ρ = 0.52,p = 0.08)。
尽管HHC率很高,但我们机构在2011年仍发生了MDRA暴发。尽管HHC率保持稳定,但普通外科ICU在暴发后MRSA、VRE和艰难梭菌的感染率有所下降。这表明除HHC外,感染控制策略在预防医院病原体传播中起着关键作用,尤其是当HHC率已达到最高水平时。