Tan Shaolin, Feng Shasha, Wang Pei, Chen Yao
College of Electrical and Information Engineering, Hunan University, Changsha, 410082, China,
Bull Math Biol. 2014 Nov;76(11):2785-805. doi: 10.1007/s11538-014-0031-y. Epub 2014 Oct 1.
Evolutionary game theory provides an appropriate tool for investigating the competition and diffusion of behavioral traits in biological or social populations. A core challenge in evolutionary game theory is the strategy selection problem: Given two strategies, which one is favored by the population? Recent studies suggest that the answer depends not only on the payoff functions of strategies but also on the interaction structure of the population. Group interactions are one of the fundamental interactive modes within populations. This work aims to investigate the strategy selection problem in evolutionary game dynamics on group interaction networks. In detail, the strategy selection conditions are obtained for some typical networks with group interactions. Furthermore, the obtained conditions are applied to investigate selection between cooperation and defection in populations. The conditions for evolution of cooperation are derived for both the public goods game and volunteer's dilemma game. Numerical experiments validate the above analytical results.
进化博弈论为研究生物或社会群体中行为特征的竞争与扩散提供了一种合适的工具。进化博弈论中的一个核心挑战是策略选择问题：给定两种策略，群体更青睐哪一种？最近的研究表明，答案不仅取决于策略的收益函数，还取决于群体的互动结构。群体互动是群体内部基本的互动模式之一。这项工作旨在研究群体互动网络上进化博弈动力学中的策略选择问题。具体而言，得到了一些具有群体互动的典型网络的策略选择条件。此外，将所得条件应用于研究群体中合作与背叛之间的选择。推导了公共物品博弈和志愿者困境博弈中合作进化的条件。数值实验验证了上述分析结果。
