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通过语言和现象经验进行共享意向参与。

Shared intentional engagement through language and phenomenal experience.

机构信息

University of Heidelberg, Phenomenological Section, Clinic for General Psychiatry Heidelberg, Germany.

出版信息

Front Psychol. 2014 Oct 8;5:1016. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01016. eCollection 2014.

Abstract

This article introduces the notion of shared intentional engagement and argues that the current debate around intersubjective interaction can profit from taking that notion into account. Shared intentional engagement holds between people when they relate together to the same meaningful entities. For instance, when people talk about something, they share intentional engagement as long as they don't talk past each other. But what if the entity talked about involves perceptual experience-is the quality of one's experiences not something that cannot be conveyed to others through language? Against this widespread idea, this article takes up philosophical arguments for the intersubjectivity of, on the one hand, language, and, on the other hand, phenomenal experience. It contents that language and phenomenal experience both exhibit shared structures that enable shared intentional engagement. It then considers an example for how this result matches well with empirical research on "pop out" experiences. Because shared intentional engagement is fundamental for all kinds of human interaction, it necessitates interdisciplinary investigations that are frequently hindered by the assumption that the phenomenal experiences of humans are hidden to others.

摘要

本文介绍了共同意向参与的概念,并认为当前关于主体间互动的争论可以从考虑这一概念中受益。当人们共同关注同一有意义的实体时,他们之间就存在共同意向参与。例如,当人们谈论某件事情时,只要他们不是在自说自话,他们就存在共同意向参与。但是,如果所谈论的实体涉及到知觉体验——一个人的体验质量是否无法通过语言传达给他人?针对这种普遍观点,本文提出了哲学论据,一方面支持语言的主体间性,另一方面支持现象体验的主体间性。本文认为,语言和现象体验都表现出共享的结构,从而能够实现共同意向参与。然后,本文考虑了一个例子,说明这一结果如何与关于“突显”体验的实证研究很好地匹配。由于共同意向参与是所有人类互动的基础,因此需要进行跨学科研究,但这种研究常常受到这样一种假设的阻碍,即人类的现象体验对他人来说是隐藏的。

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本文引用的文献

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Behav Brain Sci. 2013 Aug;36(4):393-414. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X12000660.
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Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2012 May 1;109(18):6819-24. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1113347109. Epub 2012 Apr 16.
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