Nadeem Muhammad
Department of Basic Sciences, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), H-12 Islamabad, Pakistan.
Sci Rep. 2014 Oct 27;4:6774. doi: 10.1038/srep06774.
A new commitment scheme based on position-verification and non-local quantum correlations is presented here for the first time in literature. The only credential for unconditional security is the position of committer and non-local correlations generated; neither receiver has any pre-shared data with the committer nor does receiver require trusted and authenticated quantum/classical channels between him and the committer. In the proposed scheme, receiver trusts the commitment only if the scheme itself verifies position of the committer and validates her commitment through non-local quantum correlations in a single round. The position-based commitment scheme bounds committer to reveal valid commitment within allocated time and guarantees that the receiver will not be able to get information about commitment unless committer reveals. The scheme works for the commitment of both bits and qubits and is equally secure against committer/receiver as well as against any third party who may have interests in destroying the commitment. Our proposed scheme is unconditionally secure in general and evades Mayers and Lo-Chau attacks in particular.
本文首次在文献中提出了一种基于位置验证和非局域量子关联的新型承诺方案。无条件安全性的唯一凭证是承诺者的位置和生成的非局域关联;接收者与承诺者之间没有任何预先共享的数据,接收者也不需要他与承诺者之间有可信且经过认证的量子/经典信道。在所提出的方案中,只有当该方案本身在单个回合中通过非局域量子关联验证承诺者的位置并验证其承诺时,接收者才会信任该承诺。基于位置的承诺方案限制承诺者在规定时间内揭示有效的承诺,并保证除非承诺者揭示,接收者无法获取有关承诺的信息。该方案适用于比特和量子比特的承诺,并且对于承诺者/接收者以及任何可能有兴趣破坏承诺的第三方而言同样安全。我们提出的方案总体上是无条件安全的,尤其能规避迈尔斯攻击和洛-周攻击。