Nicholas Lauren Hersch
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 624 N Broadway, Baltimore, MD 21205. Email:
Am J Manag Care. 2014;20(11):917-24.
To assess the relationship between Medicare Advantage (MA) plan rebates and enrollment and simulate the effects of Affordable Care Act (ACA) payment reforms.
First difference regressions of county-level MA payment and enrollment data from CMS from 2006 to 2010.
A $10 decrease in the per member/per month rebate to MA plans was associated with a 0.20 percentage point (0.9%) decrease in MA penetration (P < .001) and a 7.1% decline in the average MA enrollee's risk score (P < .001). These effects are small overall, but larger in counties with low levels of traditional Medicare spending; a $10 decrease in monthly rebates was associated with a 0.64 percentage point decline in MA penetration and a 10% decrease in risk score. ACA reforms are predicted to reduce the level of rebates in lower-spending counties, leading to enrollment decreases of 1.7 to 1.9 percentage points in the lowest-spending counties. The simulation predicts that the disenrollment would come from MA enrollees with higher risk scores.
MA enrollment responds to availability of supplemental benefits supported by rebates. ACA provisions designed to lower MA spending will predominantly affect Medicare beneficiaries living in counties where MA plans may be unable to offer a comparable product at a price similar to that of traditional Medicare.
评估联邦医疗保险优势(MA)计划回扣与参保人数之间的关系,并模拟《平价医疗法案》(ACA)支付改革的效果。
对2006年至2010年医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心(CMS)提供的县级MA支付和参保数据进行一阶差分回归分析。
MA计划每位成员每月回扣减少10美元,与MA渗透率下降0.20个百分点(0.9%)(P <.001)以及MA参保者平均风险评分下降7.1%(P <.001)相关。总体而言,这些影响较小,但在传统医疗保险支出水平较低的县影响较大;每月回扣减少10美元,与MA渗透率下降0.64个百分点以及风险评分下降10%相关。预计ACA改革将降低支出较低县的回扣水平,导致支出最低的县参保人数下降1.7至1.9个百分点。模拟结果预测,退出MA计划的将是风险评分较高的参保者。
MA参保人数对回扣支持的补充福利的可得性有反应。旨在降低MA支出的ACA条款将主要影响居住在MA计划可能无法以与传统医疗保险类似的价格提供可比产品的县的医疗保险受益人。