Pletti Carolina, Sarlo Michela, Palomba Daniela, Rumiati Rino, Lotto Lorella
Department of General Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy.
Department of General Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy; Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Padova, Padova, Italy.
Brain Cogn. 2015 Mar;94:24-31. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2015.01.004. Epub 2015 Jan 29.
In any modern society killing is regarded as a severe violation of the legal codes that is subjected to penal judgment. Therefore, it is likely that people take legal consequences into account when deciding about the hypothetical killing of one person in classic moral dilemmas, with legal concerns contributing to decision-making. In particular, by differing for the degree of intentionality and emotional salience, Footbridge- and Trolley-type dilemmas might promote differential assignment of blame and punishment while implicating the same severity of harm. The present study was aimed at comparing the neural activity, subjective emotional reactions, and behavioral choices in two groups of participants who either took (Legal group) or did not take (No Legal group) legal consequences into account when deciding on Footbridge-type and Trolley-type moral dilemmas. Stimulus- and response-locked ERPs were measured to investigate the neural activity underlying two separate phases of the decision process. No difference in behavioral choices was found between groups. However, the No Legal group reported greater overall emotional impact, associated with lower preparation for action, suggesting greater conflict between alternative motor responses representing the different decision choices. In contrast, the Legal group showed an overall dampened affective experience during decision-making associated with greater overall action readiness and intention to act, reflecting lower conflict in responding. On these bases, we suggest that in moral dilemmas legal consequences of actions provide a sort of reference point on which people can rely to support a decision, independent of dilemma type.
在任何现代社会中，杀人都被视为严重违反法典的行为，并会受到刑事审判。因此，在经典道德困境中决定是否假设杀死一个人时，人们很可能会考虑法律后果，法律因素会影响决策。特别是，天桥困境和电车困境因故意程度和情感显著性的不同，可能会导致在伤害程度相同的情况下，对责备和惩罚的分配有所差异。本研究旨在比较两组参与者在面对天桥型和电车型道德困境时的神经活动、主观情绪反应和行为选择，其中一组（法律组）在做决策时考虑了法律后果，另一组（无法律组）则没有考虑。通过测量与刺激和反应相关的事件相关电位（ERP），来研究决策过程中两个不同阶段的神经活动。结果发现两组在行为选择上没有差异。然而，无法律组报告的总体情绪影响更大，且行动准备较低，这表明代表不同决策选择的替代运动反应之间存在更大的冲突。相比之下，法律组在决策过程中总体情感体验受到抑制，同时总体行动准备和行动意图更强，这反映出反应中的冲突较小。基于这些结果，我们认为在道德困境中，行为的法律后果提供了一种参考点，人们可以依靠它来支持决策，而不受困境类型的影响。
