Tsai Thomas C, Joynt Karen E, Wild Robert C, Orav E John, Jha Ashish K
Thomas C. Tsai is a research associate in the Department of Health Policy and Management at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and a general surgery resident in the Department of Surgery at Brigham and Women's Hospital. He is currently serving as a senior adviser to the deputy assistant secretary for health policy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), Department of Health and Human Services, in Washington, D.C.
Karen E. Joynt is currently serving as a senior adviser to the deputy assistant secretary for health policy, ASPE, Department of Health and Human Services. At the time that this article was prepared, she was an instructor of medicine in the Division of Cardiovascular Medicine at Brigham and Women's Hospital and an instructor in the Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.
Health Aff (Millwood). 2015 Mar;34(3):371-80. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2014.0900.
The Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative is a federally funded innovation model mandated by the Affordable Care Act. It is designed to help transition Medicare away from fee-for-service payments and toward bundling a single payment for an episode of acute care in a hospital and related postacute care in an appropriate setting. While results from the initiative will not be available for several years, current data can help provide critical early insights. However, little is known about the participating organizations and how they are focusing their efforts. We identified participating hospitals and used national Medicare claims data to assess their characteristics and previous spending patterns. These hospitals are mostly large, nonprofit, teaching hospitals in the Northeast, and they have selectively enrolled in the bundled payment initiative covering patient conditions with high clinical volumes. We found no significant differences in episode-based spending between participating and nonparticipating hospitals. Postacute care explains the largest variation in overall episode-based spending, signaling an opportunity to align incentives across providers. However, the focus on a few selected clinical conditions and the high degree of integration that already exists between enrolled hospitals and postacute care providers may limit the generalizability of bundled payment across the Medicare system.
“改善护理捆绑支付计划”是一项由联邦政府资助的创新模式,受《平价医疗法案》的授权。该计划旨在帮助医疗保险从按服务付费模式转型,转向为医院急性护理期间及相应的合适环境下的后期护理捆绑支付单一费用。虽然该计划的结果在几年内都无法获取,但现有数据有助于提供关键的早期见解。然而,对于参与该计划的组织以及它们如何集中精力,我们了解甚少。我们确定了参与的医院,并利用全国医疗保险理赔数据来评估它们的特征和以往的支出模式。这些医院大多是位于东北部地区的大型非营利性教学医院,它们有选择地参与了涵盖临床病例数量较多的患者病情的捆绑支付计划。我们发现,参与计划的医院和未参与计划的医院在基于病例的支出方面没有显著差异。后期护理在总体基于病例的支出中差异最大,这表明在不同医疗服务提供者之间调整激励措施存在机会。然而,对少数选定临床病症的关注以及参与计划的医院与后期护理提供者之间已经存在的高度整合,可能会限制捆绑支付在整个医疗保险系统中的推广性。