Buzsáki György, Peyrache Adrien, Kubie John
The Neuroscience Institute, New York University, School of Medicine, New York, New York 10016 Center for Neural Science, New York University, School of Medicine, New York, New York 10016
The Neuroscience Institute, New York University, School of Medicine, New York, New York 10016.
Cold Spring Harb Symp Quant Biol. 2014;79:41-50. doi: 10.1101/sqb.2014.79.024679. Epub 2015 Mar 9.
Theories of brain function have evolved through multiple stages. The first proposition was that brain networks support a set of reflex responses, with current sensory inputs producing immediate motor outputs. The behaviorist paradigm suggested that actions can always be explained as a response to immediate external cues. In response to these views, the cognitive paradigm argued that behavior cannot be understood simply as input-output functions because the hidden layers of brain generate unpredictability. The central processing was termed "cognition." Here we propose a neuroscience-based model of cognition. Our core hypothesis is that cognition depends on internal models of the animal and its world, where internally generated sequences can serve to perform "what if" scenarios and anticipate the possible consequences of alternative actions without actually testing them, and aid in the decisions of overt actions. We support our hypotheses by several examples of recent experimental findings and show how externally guided cell assembly sequences become internalized to support cognitive functions.
脑功能理论已经历了多个发展阶段。最初的观点认为,脑网络支持一系列反射反应,当前的感觉输入产生即时的运动输出。行为主义范式表明,行为总是可以解释为对即时外部线索的反应。针对这些观点,认知范式认为,行为不能简单地被理解为输入-输出功能,因为脑的隐藏层会产生不可预测性。这种中央处理被称为“认知”。在此,我们提出一种基于神经科学的认知模型。我们的核心假设是,认知依赖于动物及其所处世界的内部模型,在这个模型中,内部生成的序列可以用来执行“如果……会怎样”的情景模拟,预测替代行动的可能后果,而无需实际进行测试,并有助于做出公开行动的决策。我们通过最近一些实验结果的例子来支持我们的假设,并展示外部引导的细胞集合序列是如何内化以支持认知功能的。