Hunt H T
Percept Mot Skills. 1985 Feb;60(1):239-82. doi: 10.2466/pms.1985.60.1.239.
Recent criticisms of the place and function of "consciousness" in "cognitive science" are considered and rejected. Contrary to current orthodoxy subjective experience during abstract cognitive activity, especially when placed in its natural series with phenomenal accounts of so-called "altered states of consciousness," can provide unique and crucial evidence concerning just that core of "semantics" which eludes the automatized "syntax" of computer simulation. The "noetic" aspect of extreme altered states can be placed in relation to introspective descriptions of "insight." Various altered state features--synaesthesias, geometric/mandala imagery, reorganizations of "perceptual" dimensions and enhanced "self-reference"--can be taken as direct "exteriorizations" of abstract symbolic processes as discussed by Neisser, Geschwind, Mead, and Arnheim. A genuine cognitive psychology cannot continue to ignore the qualitative-experiential bases of symbolization. More specifically, the sense that insight just comes to us as if from "outside," its preliminary microgenetic processes masked, does not show the failure of introspective phenomenology but rather offers a unique and positive clue to the imaginal dialogic structure of higher mental processes. Thinking, as one phase of imaginal "conversation," must be "sent" from the phenomenal "other" to an attenuated, receptive phenomenal "self." A reconsideration of the Würzburg controversy, adding closely related altered state phenomena to the transitional series between "impalpable awareness" and specific imagery, suggests that the normally masked processes underlying the "felt meaning" or "insight" state are most directly exteriorized as what Klüver termed "complex" or geometric-dynamic synaesthesias. Finally, a reinterpretation of classical introspectionism's "sensation" shows the "mechanism" by which the metaphorical/synaesthetic processes of cognition are generated. Titchener's "sensation" plays the crucial role in metaphor it so conspicuously lacked in functional perception.
对“意识”在“认知科学”中的地位和作用的近期批评得到了审视并被驳回。与当前的正统观点相反，抽象认知活动中的主观体验，尤其是当它与所谓“意识改变状态”的现象学描述处于自然序列中时，能够提供关于“语义学”核心的独特且关键的证据，而这一核心是计算机模拟的自动化“句法”所无法触及的。极端意识改变状态的“智性”方面可以与“顿悟”的内省描述联系起来。各种意识改变状态的特征——联觉、几何/曼陀罗意象、“感知”维度的重组以及增强的“自我指涉”——可以被视为奈塞尔、盖什温德、米德和阿恩海姆所讨论的抽象符号过程的直接“外在化”。真正的认知心理学不能再继续忽视符号化的质性体验基础。更具体地说，那种顿悟仿佛是从“外部”降临到我们身上，其初步的微观发生过程被掩盖的感觉，并非表明内省现象学的失败，而是为高级心理过程的意象对话结构提供了独特且积极的线索。思维作为意象“对话”的一个阶段，必须从现象学的“他者”“发送”到一个弱化的、具有接受性的现象学“自我”。对维尔茨堡争议的重新审视，将密切相关的意识改变状态现象添加到“难以捉摸的意识”和特定意象之间的过渡序列中，这表明在“感觉意义”或“顿悟”状态之下通常被掩盖的过程最直接地外在化为克吕弗所称的“复合体”或几何动态联觉。最后，对经典内省主义的“感觉”的重新解释揭示了认知的隐喻/联觉过程产生的“机制”。铁钦纳的“感觉”在隐喻中发挥了它在功能感知中明显缺乏的关键作用。
