O'Connor Kieron P, Aardema Frederick
Centre de recherche Fernand-Seguin, 7331 Hochelaga St., Montréal, Que., Canada H1N 3V2.
Conscious Cogn. 2005 Jun;14(2):233-56. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.005. Epub 2004 Nov 2.
This article is an attempt to situate imagination within consciousness complete with its own pre-cognitive, cognitive, and meta-cognitive domains. In the first sections we briefly review traditional philosophical and psychological conceptions of the imagination. The majority have viewed perception and imagination as separate faculties, performing distinct functions. A return to a phenomenological account of the imagination suggests that divisions between perception and imagination are transcended by precognitive factors of sense of reality and non-reality where perception and imagination play an indivisible role. In fact, both imagination and perception define sense of reality jointly according to what is possible and not possible. Absorption in a possible world depends on the strengths of alternative possibilities, and the relationship between core and marginal consciousness. The model may offer a parsimonious account of different states and levels of imaginal consciousness, and of how "believed-in imaginings" develop and become under some circumstances "lived-in experiences."
本文试图将想象置于意识之中，使其具备自身的前认知、认知和元认知领域。在开头部分，我们简要回顾了关于想象的传统哲学和心理学概念。大多数人将感知和想象视为不同的官能，执行着不同的功能。回归到对想象的现象学解释表明，感知与想象之间的区分被现实感和非现实感的前认知因素所超越，在这些因素中，感知和想象发挥着不可分割的作用。事实上，想象和感知共同根据可能与不可能的情况来界定现实感。沉浸于一个可能世界取决于替代可能性的强度，以及核心意识与边缘意识之间的关系。该模型或许能够简洁地解释想象意识的不同状态和层次，以及“信以为真的想象”是如何发展并在某些情况下成为“身临其境的体验”的。
