Wolf Jason B, Howie Jennifer A, Parkinson Katie, Gruenheit Nicole, Melo Diogo, Rozen Daniel, Thompson Christopher R L
Department of Biology and Biochemistry, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK.
Faculty of Life Sciences, Michael Smith Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PT, UK.
Curr Biol. 2015 Apr 20;25(8):1086-90. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2015.02.061. Epub 2015 Mar 26.
Cooperation is ubiquitous across the tree of life, from simple microbes to the complex social systems of animals. Individuals cooperate by engaging in costly behaviors that can be exploited by other individuals who benefit by avoiding these associated costs. Thus, if successful exploitation of social partners during cooperative interactions increases relative fitness, then we expect selection to lead to the emergence of a single optimal winning strategy in which individuals maximize their gain from cooperation while minimizing their associated costs. Such social "cheating" appears to be widespread in nature, including in several microbial systems, but despite the fitness advantages favoring social cheating, populations tend to harbor significant variation in social success rather than a single optimal winning strategy. Using the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, we provide a possible explanation for the coexistence of such variation. We find that genotypes typically designated as "cheaters" because they produce a disproportionate number of spores in chimeric fruiting bodies do not actually gain higher fitness as a result of this apparent advantage because they produce smaller, less viable spores than putative "losers." As a consequence of this trade-off between spore number and viability, genotypes with different spore production strategies, which give the appearance of differential social success, ultimately have similar realized fitness. These findings highlight the limitations of using single fitness proxies in evolutionary studies and suggest that interpreting social trait variation in terms of strategies like cheating or cooperating may be misleading unless these behaviors are considered in the context of the true multidimensional nature of fitness.
合作在生命之树上无处不在,从简单的微生物到动物复杂的社会系统。个体通过参与代价高昂的行为进行合作,而这些行为可能会被其他个体利用,这些个体通过避免这些相关成本而受益。因此,如果在合作互动中成功利用社会伙伴能提高相对适应性,那么我们预期选择会导致出现一种单一的最优获胜策略,即个体在将合作收益最大化的同时,将相关成本最小化。这种社会“欺骗”在自然界似乎很普遍,包括在一些微生物系统中,但尽管社会欺骗具有适应性优势,种群在社会成功方面往往存在显著差异,而不是单一的最优获胜策略。利用社会变形虫盘基网柄菌,我们为这种变异的共存提供了一种可能的解释。我们发现,通常被称为“欺骗者”的基因型,因为它们在嵌合子实体中产生的孢子数量不成比例,但实际上并不会因为这种明显的优势而获得更高的适应性,因为它们产生的孢子比假定的“失败者”更小、活力更低。由于孢子数量和活力之间的这种权衡,具有不同孢子生产策略的基因型,虽然看起来社会成功程度不同,但最终具有相似的实际适应性。这些发现突出了在进化研究中使用单一适应性指标的局限性,并表明,除非在适应性真正的多维度性质的背景下考虑这些行为,否则用欺骗或合作等策略来解释社会性状变异可能会产生误导。