Schlimme Jann E, Wiggins Osborne P, Schwartz Michael A
Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Charité University Medicine, Charitéplatz 1, 10117, Berlin, Germany,
Theor Med Bioeth. 2015 Apr;36(2):117-20. doi: 10.1007/s11017-015-9325-9.
Understanding the mental life of persons with psychosis/schizophrenia has been the crucial challenge of psychiatry since its origins, both for scientific models as well as for every therapeutic encounter between persons with and without psychosis/schizophrenia. Nonetheless, a preliminary understanding is always the first step of phenomenological as well as other qualitative research methods addressing persons with psychotic experiences in their life-world. In contrast to Rashed's assertions, in order to achieve such understanding, phenomenological psychopathologists need not necessarily adopt the transcendental-phenomenological attitude, which, however, is often required if performing phenomenological philosophy. Additionally, in the course of these (non-philosophical) scientific endeavors, differences between persons with psychosis/schizophrenia and so-called normal people seem to have a methodological function and value driving the scientist in her enterprise. Yet, these differences do not extend to ethical dimensions, and therefore, do not by any means touch ethical equality.
自精神病学诞生以来,理解患有精神病/精神分裂症患者的精神生活一直是该领域的关键挑战,这对于科学模型以及精神病/精神分裂症患者与非患者之间的每一次治疗接触而言都是如此。尽管如此,初步理解始终是现象学以及其他质性研究方法的第一步,这些方法旨在研究生活世界中具有精神病体验的人群。与拉希德的断言相反,为了达成这种理解,现象学精神病理学家不一定需要采用先验现象学态度,然而,进行现象学哲学研究时通常需要这种态度。此外,在这些(非哲学的)科学探索过程中,患有精神病/精神分裂症的人与所谓正常人之间的差异似乎具有一种方法论功能和价值,推动着科学家开展其工作。然而,这些差异并不延伸至伦理层面,因此,绝无触及伦理平等之意。