Briscoe Robert, Schwenkler John
Department of Philosophy, Ohio University.
Department of Philosophy, Florida State University.
Cogn Sci. 2015 Sep;39(7):1435-67. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12226. Epub 2015 Apr 2.
It is natural to assume that the fine-grained and highly accurate spatial information present in visual experience is often used to guide our bodily actions. Yet this assumption has been challenged by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH), according to which visuomotor programming is the responsibility of a "zombie" processing stream whose sources of bottom-up spatial information are entirely non-conscious (Clark, 2007, 2009; Goodale & Milner, 1992, 2004a; Milner & Goodale, 1995/2006, 2008). In many formulations of TVSH, the role of conscious vision in action is limited to "recognizing objects, selecting targets for action, and determining what kinds of action, broadly speaking, to perform" (Clark, 2007, p. 570). Our aim in this study is to show that the available evidence not only fails to support this dichotomous view but actually reveals a significant role for conscious vision in motor programming, especially for actions that require deliberate attention.
自然而然会认为，视觉体验中呈现的精细且高度准确的空间信息常常被用于指导我们的身体行动。然而，这一假设受到了双视觉系统假说（TVSH）支持者的挑战，根据该假说，视觉运动编程由一个“僵尸”处理流负责，其自下而上的空间信息来源完全是非意识的（克拉克，2007年，2009年；古德尔和米尔纳，1992年，2004年a；米尔纳和古德尔，1995/2006年，2008年）。在TVSH的许多表述中，有意识视觉在行动中的作用仅限于“识别物体、选择行动目标以及大体上确定要执行何种行动”（克拉克，2007年，第570页）。我们在本研究中的目的是表明，现有证据不仅未能支持这种二分观点，反而实际上揭示了有意识视觉在运动编程中发挥的重要作用，特别是对于需要刻意关注的行动。
