Zefferman Matthew R, Mathew Sarah
Evol Anthropol. 2015 Mar-Apr;24(2):50-61. doi: 10.1002/evan.21439.
When humans wage war, it is not unusual for battlefields to be strewn with dead warriors. These warriors typically were men in their reproductive prime who, had they not died in battle, might have gone on to father more children. Typically, they are also genetically unrelated to one another. We know of no other animal species in which reproductively capable, genetically unrelated individuals risk their lives in this manner. Because the immense private costs borne by individual warriors create benefits that are shared widely by others in their group, warfare is a stark evolutionary puzzle that is difficult to explain. Although several scholars have posited models of the evolution of human warfare, these models do not adequately explain how humans solve the problem of collective action in warfare at the evolutionarily novel scale of hundreds of genetically unrelated individuals. We propose that group-structured cultural selection explains this phenomenon.
当人类发动战争时,战场上布满死去的战士是很常见的。这些战士通常是处于生殖盛期的男性,如果他们没有战死沙场,可能会生育更多子女。通常,他们彼此之间也没有亲缘关系。我们所知的其他动物物种中,没有生殖能力且没有亲缘关系的个体会以这种方式冒生命危险。由于个体战士承担的巨大个人代价所产生的利益被群体中的其他人广泛共享,战争是一个难以解释的严峻进化难题。尽管几位学者提出了人类战争进化的模型,但这些模型并不能充分解释人类如何在数百个没有亲缘关系的个体这一进化上新的规模上解决战争中的集体行动问题。我们认为群体结构的文化选择可以解释这一现象。