Blackstone E A, Fuhr J P
Department of Economics, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122.
J Med Syst. 1989 Aug;13(4):193-203. doi: 10.1007/BF00996642.
There have been numerous antitrust cases concerning exclusive hospitals privileges. The plaintiff often alleges both that he was foreclosed from the market and that an illegal tying agreement exists. This paper, which draws heavily from the cases, concludes both that the relevant market for hospital based physicians is national and that the impact on competition is minimal. The hospital frequently initiates the exclusive arrangement which suggests that efficiency is enhanced. Our analysis also shows that the tying claims are generally unpersuasive. However, exclusive arrangements on occasion may be a device to exclude competitors. Finally, economic criteria are developed to help determine the desirability of particular exclusive arrangements.
已经有许多关于医院专属特权的反垄断案件。原告常常声称,他被排除在市场之外,并且存在非法的搭售协议。本文大量借鉴了这些案例,得出结论:以医院为基础的医生的相关市场是全国性的,且对竞争的影响微乎其微。医院经常发起独家安排,这表明效率得到了提高。我们的分析还表明,搭售指控通常没有说服力。然而,独家安排有时可能是排挤竞争对手的一种手段。最后,制定了经济标准以帮助确定特定独家安排的可取性。