Risk-Based Decision Making for Reoccupation of Contaminated Areas Following a Wide-Area Anthrax Release.

This article presents an analysis of postattack response strategies to mitigate the risks of reoccupying contaminated areas following a release of Bacillus anthracis spores (the bacterium responsible for causing anthrax) in an urban setting. The analysis is based on a hypothetical attack scenario in which individuals are exposed to B. anthracis spores during an initial aerosol release and then placed on prophylactic antibiotics that successfully protect them against the initial aerosol exposure. The risk from reoccupying buildings contaminated with spores due to their reaerosolization and inhalation is then evaluated. The response options considered include: decontamination of the buildings, vaccination of individuals reoccupying the buildings, extended evacuation of individuals from the contaminated buildings, and combinations of these options. The study uses a decision tree to estimate the costs and benefits of alternative response strategies across a range of exposure risks. Results for best estimates of model inputs suggest that the most cost-effective response for high-risk scenarios (individual chance of infection exceeding 11%) consists of evacuation and building decontamination. For infection risks between 4% and 11%, the preferred option is to evacuate for a short period, vaccinate, and then reoccupy once the vaccine has taken effect. For risks between 0.003% and 4%, the preferred option is to vaccinate only. For risks below 0.003%, none of the mitigation actions have positive expected monetary benefits. A sensitivity analysis indicates that for high-infection-likelihood scenarios, vaccination is recommended in the case where decontamination efficacy is less than 99.99%.