Skerry Amy E, Saxe Rebecca
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
Curr Biol. 2015 Aug 3;25(15):1945-54. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2015.06.009. Epub 2015 Jul 23.
Research on emotion attribution has tended to focus on the perception of overt expressions of at most five or six basic emotions. However, our ability to identify others' emotional states is not limited to perception of these canonical expressions. Instead, we make fine-grained inferences about what others feel based on the situations they encounter, relying on knowledge of the eliciting conditions for different emotions. In the present research, we provide convergent behavioral and neural evidence concerning the representations underlying these concepts. First, we find that patterns of activity in mentalizing regions contain information about subtle emotional distinctions conveyed through verbal descriptions of eliciting situations. Second, we identify a space of abstract situation features that well captures the emotion discriminations subjects make behaviorally and show that this feature space outperforms competing models in capturing the similarity space of neural patterns in these regions. Together, the data suggest that our knowledge of others' emotions is abstract and high dimensional, that brain regions selective for mental state reasoning support relatively subtle distinctions between emotion concepts, and that the neural representations in these regions are not reducible to more primitive affective dimensions such as valence and arousal.
关于情绪归因的研究往往集中在对至多五六种基本情绪的外在表达的感知上。然而,我们识别他人情绪状态的能力并不局限于对这些典型表情的感知。相反,我们会根据他人所遇到的情境,依靠对不同情绪诱发条件的了解,对他人的感受做出细致入微的推断。在本研究中,我们提供了关于这些概念背后表征的一致行为和神经证据。首先,我们发现心理化区域的活动模式包含了通过对诱发情境的语言描述所传达的细微情绪差异的信息。其次,我们识别出一个抽象情境特征空间,它很好地捕捉了受试者在行为上做出的情绪区分,并表明这个特征空间在捕捉这些区域神经模式的相似性空间方面优于竞争模型。总体而言,数据表明我们对他人情绪的认知是抽象且高维度的,对心理状态推理具有选择性的脑区支持情绪概念之间相对细微的区分,并且这些区域的神经表征不能简化为诸如效价和唤醒等更原始的情感维度。