Gyngell Chris
Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
J Med Philos. 2015 Dec;40(6):696-713. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhv027. Epub 2015 Oct 9.
One argument that is sometimes made against pursuing radical forms of human life extension is that such interventions will make the species less evolvable, which would be morally undesirable. In this article, I discuss the empirical and evaluative claims of this argument. I argue that radical increases in life expectancy could, in principle, reduce the evolutionary potential of human populations through both biological and cultural mechanisms. I further argue that if life extension did reduce the evolvability of the species, this will be undesirable for three reasons: (1) it may increase the species' susceptibility to extinction risks, (2) it may adversely affect institutions and practices that promote well-being, and (3) it may impede moral progress.
有时有人反对追求激进的人类寿命延长形式,理由是这种干预会使人类物种的可进化性降低,而这在道德上是不可取的。在本文中,我将讨论这一论点的实证主张和评价主张。我认为,从原则上讲,预期寿命的大幅提高可能会通过生物和文化机制降低人类群体的进化潜力。我进一步认为,如果寿命延长确实降低了物种的可进化性,那么这将出于三个原因而不可取:(1)它可能会增加物种灭绝风险的易感性,(2)它可能会对促进福祉的制度和实践产生不利影响,(3)它可能会阻碍道德进步。