Garson Justin
Department of Philosophy, Hunter College of the City University of New York, 695, Park Ave., New York, NY 10065, USA.
Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci. 2016 Apr;56:7-14. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.10.011. Epub 2015 Nov 21.
I develop a distinction between two types of psychological hedonism. Inferential hedonism (or "I-hedonism") holds that each person only has ultimate desires regarding his or her own hedonic states (pleasure and pain). Reinforcement hedonism (or "R-hedonism") holds that each person's ultimate desires, whatever their contents are, are differentially reinforced in that person's cognitive system only by virtue of their association with hedonic states. I'll argue that accepting R-hedonism and rejecting I-hedonism provides a conciliatory position on the traditional altruism debate, and that it coheres well with the neuroscientist Anthony Dickinson's theory about the evolutionary function of hedonic states, the "hedonic interface theory." Finally, I'll defend R-hedonism from potential objections.
我对两种类型的心理享乐主义进行了区分。推理享乐主义（或“I-享乐主义”）认为，每个人仅对自己的享乐状态（快乐和痛苦）拥有终极欲望。强化享乐主义（或“R-享乐主义”）认为，每个人的终极欲望，无论其内容如何，在其认知系统中仅因其与享乐状态的关联而得到不同程度的强化。我将论证，接受R-享乐主义并拒绝I-享乐主义为传统利他主义辩论提供了一种调和立场，并且它与神经科学家安东尼·迪金森关于享乐状态进化功能的理论“享乐界面理论”非常契合。最后，我将为R-享乐主义抵御潜在的反对意见。
