De Vito Stefania, Bonnefon Jean-François
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse, France.
Psychon Bull Rev. 2014 Oct;21(5):1331-8. doi: 10.3758/s13423-014-0592-7.
Current computational models of theory of mind typically assume that humans believe each other to selfishly maximize utility, for a conception of utility that makes it indistinguishable from personal gains. We argue that this conception is at odds with established facts about human altruism, as well as the altruism that humans expect from each other. We report two experiments showing that people expect other agents to selfishly maximize their pleasure, even when these other agents behave altruistically. Accordingly, defining utility as pleasure permits us to reconcile the assumption that humans expect each other to selfishly maximize utility with the fact that humans expect each other to behave altruistically.
当前的心理理论计算模型通常假定，人类认为彼此会自私地追求效用最大化，这里的效用概念与个人利益难以区分。我们认为，这种概念与关于人类利他主义以及人类期望彼此具有的利他主义的既定事实不符。我们报告了两项实验，结果表明人们期望其他主体自私地追求自身愉悦最大化，即使这些其他主体表现出利他行为。因此，将效用定义为愉悦使我们能够调和这样一种假设，即人类期望彼此自私地追求效用最大化，与人类期望彼此表现出利他行为这一事实。
