Capuno Joseph J, Kraft Aleli D, Quimbo Stella, Tan Carlos R, Wagstaff Adam
School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines.
Development Research Group, The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.
Health Econ. 2016 Jun;25(6):650-62. doi: 10.1002/hec.3291. Epub 2015 Dec 1.
A cluster randomized experiment was undertaken testing two sets of interventions encouraging enrollment in the Individually Paying Program (IPP), the voluntary component of the Philippines' social health insurance program. In early 2011, 1037 unenrolled IPP-eligible families in 179 randomly selected intervention municipalities were given an information kit and offered a 50% premium subsidy valid until the end of 2011; 383 IPP-eligible families in 64 control municipalities were not. In February 2012, the 787 families in the intervention sites who were still IPP-eligible but had not enrolled had their vouchers extended, were resent the enrollment kits and received SMS reminders. Half the group also received a 'handholding' intervention: in the endline interview, the enumerator offered to help complete the enrollment form, deliver it to the insurer's office in the provincial capital, and mail the membership cards. The main intervention raised the enrollment rate by 3 percentage points (ppts) (p = 0.11), with an 8 ppt larger effect (p < 0.01) among city-dwellers, consistent with travel time to the insurance office affecting enrollment. The handholding intervention raised enrollment by 29 ppts (p < 0.01), with a smaller effect (p < 0.01) among city-dwellers, likely because of shorter travel times, and higher education levels facilitating unaided completion of the enrollment form. Copyright © The World Bank Health Economics © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
开展了一项整群随机试验,测试两组鼓励加入个人缴费计划(IPP)的干预措施,该计划是菲律宾社会医疗保险计划的自愿组成部分。2011年初,在179个随机选择的干预市中,向1037户符合IPP资格但未参保的家庭发放了信息包,并提供有效期至2011年底的50%保费补贴;而在64个对照市中的383户符合IPP资格的家庭则未获此待遇。2012年2月,干预地点中仍符合IPP资格但未参保的787户家庭的代金券得到延期,再次收到参保资料包并收到短信提醒。其中一半家庭还接受了“手把手”干预:在终期访谈中,调查员主动提出帮助填写参保表格,将其送到省会的保险公司办公室,并邮寄会员卡。主要干预措施使参保率提高了3个百分点(p = 0.11),在城市居民中的效果大8个百分点(p < 0.01),这与前往保险公司办公室的时间影响参保情况一致。“手把手”干预使参保率提高了29个百分点(p < 0.01),在城市居民中的效果较小(p < 0.01),可能是因为旅行时间较短,以及较高的教育水平便于独立填写参保表格。版权所有©世界银行 健康经济学©2015约翰·威利父子有限公司