DREES (French Directorate for Research, Studies, Evaluation and Statistics), Paris, France.
Eur J Health Econ. 2017 Jan;18(1):13-31. doi: 10.1007/s10198-015-0755-0. Epub 2015 Dec 22.
This article assesses how a waiting period for sick pay impacts sick leave patterns. In the French private sector, statutory sick benefits are granted after 3 days. However, 60 % of employers in this sector provide complementary sick pay to cover this waiting period. Linked employee-employer survey data compiled in 2009 are used to analyze the impact of this compensation on workers' sick leave behavior. The assessment isolates the insurance effect (moral hazard) from individual and environmental factors relating to sick leave (including health and working conditions). Results suggest that employees who are compensated during the 3-day waiting period are not more likely to have an absence. On the contrary, their sickness leaves are significantly shorter by 3 days on average. These results could be explained by consequences of presenteeism and ex post moral hazard when employees are exposed to a waiting period.
本文评估了病假等待期对病假模式的影响。在法国私营部门,法定病假津贴在患病 3 天后发放。然而,该部门 60%的雇主提供补充病假津贴来支付这一等待期的费用。本文利用 2009 年收集的与员工和雇主相关的调查数据,分析了这种补偿对工人病假行为的影响。评估结果将保险效应(道德风险)与与病假相关的个人和环境因素(包括健康和工作条件)区分开来。结果表明,在 3 天等待期内获得补偿的员工请病假的可能性并不更高。相反,他们的平均病假时间减少了 3 天。这些结果可以通过员工在面临等待期时出现的出勤主义和事后道德风险的后果来解释。