Elliott Mark A, Giersch Anne
School of Psychology, National University of Ireland Galway Galway, Ireland.
INSERM U1114, Department of Psychiatry, Fédération de Médecine Translationnelle de Strasbourg, Strasbourg University Hospital Strasbourg, France.
Front Psychol. 2016 Jan 7;6:1905. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01905. eCollection 2015.
There has been evidence for the very brief, temporal quantization of perceptual experience at regular intervals below 100 ms for several decades. We briefly describe how earlier studies led to the concept of "psychological moment" of between 50 and 60 ms duration. According to historical theories, within the psychological moment all events would be processed as co-temporal. More recently, a link with physiological mechanisms has been proposed, according to which the 50-60 ms psychological moment would be defined by the upper limit required by neural mechanisms to synchronize and thereby represent a snapshot of current perceptual event structure. However, our own experimental developments also identify a more fine-scaled, serialized process structure within the psychological moment. Our data suggests that not all events are processed as co-temporal within the psychological moment and instead, some are processed successively. This evidence questions the analog relationship between synchronized process and simultaneous experience and opens debate on the ontology and function of "moments" in psychological experience.
几十年来,一直有证据表明,在低于100毫秒的规则间隔下,感知体验存在非常短暂的时间量化。我们简要描述了早期研究如何引出了持续时间在50到60毫秒之间的“心理时刻”这一概念。根据历史理论,在心理时刻内,所有事件都会被当作同时发生来处理。最近,有人提出了与生理机制的联系,据此,50 - 60毫秒的心理时刻将由神经机制同步所需的上限来定义,从而呈现当前感知事件结构的快照。然而,我们自己的实验进展也在心理时刻内识别出了一个更精细的、序列化的过程结构。我们的数据表明,并非所有事件在心理时刻内都被当作同时发生来处理,相反,有些事件是相继处理的。这一证据对同步过程与同时体验之间的类比关系提出了质疑,并引发了关于心理体验中“时刻”的本体论和功能的争论。