Russo Carlo, Tufi Eleonora
Dipartimento Economia e Giurisprudenza, Università di Cassino e del Lazio Meridionale. Via S. Angelo, loc. Folcara, Italy.
Recent Pat Food Nutr Agric. 2016;8(1):4-8. doi: 10.2174/2212798408666160129103651.
Incomplete information in food consumption is a relevant topic in agricultural economics. This paper proposes a theoretical model describing consumer behavior, market equilibrium and public intervention in an industry where consumers must rely on the information of interested parties such as producers or associations.
We provide simple game theory model showing the link between price competition and the strategic use of information. If information are unverifiable (as in the case of credence attributes) firms may have no incentive to advertise true claims and consumer decisions may be biased. Our model incorporates the opportunistic behavior of self-interested information providers.
The result is a model of competition in prices and information finding a potential for market failure and public intervention. In the paper we discuss the efficiency of three possible regulations: banning false claims, subsidizing advertising campaigns, and public statement if favor of true claims.
In that context, some recent patents related to both the regulatory compliance in communication and to the reduction of asymmetric information between producers and consumers have been considered. Finally, we found that the efficiency of these policy tools is affected by the reputation of trustworthiness of the firms.
食品消费信息不完整是农业经济学中的一个相关话题。本文提出了一个理论模型，描述了在消费者必须依赖生产者或协会等利益相关方信息的行业中消费者行为、市场均衡和公共干预情况。
我们提供了一个简单的博弈论模型，展示了价格竞争与信息的策略性使用之间的联系。如果信息不可核实（如在信任属性的情况下），企业可能没有激励宣传真实声明，消费者决策可能会有偏差。我们的模型纳入了自利信息提供者的机会主义行为。
结果是一个价格和信息竞争模型，发现了市场失灵和公共干预的可能性。在本文中，我们讨论了三种可能监管措施的效率：禁止虚假声明、补贴广告活动以及支持真实声明的公开声明。
在这种背景下，考虑了一些近期与通信监管合规以及减少生产者和消费者之间信息不对称相关的专利。最后，我们发现这些政策工具的效率受到企业信誉的影响。
