Rilke Rainer M, Schurr Amos, Barkan Rachel, Shalvi Shaul
Department of Corporate Development and Business Ethics, University of Cologne Cologne, Germany.
Department of Business Administration, Ben Gurion University of the Negev Beer-Sheva, Israel.
Front Psychol. 2016 Feb 17;7:113. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00113. eCollection 2016.
Organizational monitoring relies frequently on self-reports (e.g., work hours, progress reports, travel expenses). A "one-by-one" policy requires employees to submit a series of reports (e.g., daily or itemized reports). An "all-at-once" policy requires an overall report (e.g., an annual or an overview report). Both policies use people's self-reports to determine their pay, and both allow people to inflate their reports to get higher incentives, that is, to cheat. Objectively, people can cheat to the same extent under both reporting policies. However, the two policies differ in that the segmented one-by-one policy signals closer monitoring than the all-at-once policy. We suggest here that lie aversion may have a paradoxical effect on closer monitoring and lead people to cheat more. Specifically, reporting a series of segmented units of performance (allowing small lies) should lead to more cheating than a one-shot report of overall performance (that require one larger lie). Two surveys indicated that while people perceive the all-at-once policy as more trusting, they still expected people would be equally likely to cheat in both policies. An experiment tested the effects of the two reporting policies on cheating. The findings showed that contrary to the participants' intuition, but in line with research on lie aversion, the one-by-one policy resulted in more cheating than the all-at-once policy. Implications for future research and organization policy are discussed.
组织监控常常依赖自我报告（例如工作时长、进度报告、差旅费）。“逐一”政策要求员工提交一系列报告（例如日报或明细报告）。“一次性”政策要求提交一份全面报告（例如年度报告或概述报告）。这两种政策都利用人们的自我报告来确定薪酬，而且都允许人们夸大报告内容以获得更高奖励，也就是作弊。客观而言，在这两种报告政策下人们作弊的程度可能相同。然而，这两种政策的不同之处在于，分段的“逐一”政策比“一次性”政策传递出更严密监控的信号。我们在此提出，厌恶说谎可能会对更严密的监控产生矛盾效应，导致人们作弊更多。具体而言，报告一系列分段的绩效单元（允许撒小谎）会比一次性报告整体绩效（这需要撒一个更大的谎）导致更多作弊行为。两项调查表明，虽然人们认为“一次性”政策更具信任度，但他们仍预计人们在两种政策下作弊的可能性相同。一项实验测试了这两种报告政策对作弊行为的影响。研究结果表明，与参与者的直觉相反，但与厌恶说谎的研究一致，“逐一”政策比“一次性”政策导致更多作弊行为。文中还讨论了对未来研究和组织政策的启示。
