Lawrence David R, Palacios-González César, Harris John
Camb Q Healthc Ethics. 2016 Apr;25(2):250-61. doi: 10.1017/S0963180115000559.
It seems natural to think that the same prudential and ethical reasons for mutual respect and tolerance that one has vis-à-vis other human persons would hold toward newly encountered paradigmatic but nonhuman biological persons. One also tends to think that they would have similar reasons for treating we humans as creatures that count morally in our own right. This line of thought transcends biological boundaries-namely, with regard to artificially (super)intelligent persons-but is this a safe assumption? The issue concerns ultimate moral significance: the significance possessed by human persons, persons from other planets, and hypothetical nonorganic persons in the form of artificial intelligence (AI). This article investigates why our possible relations to AI persons could be more complicated than they first might appear, given that they might possess a radically different nature to us, to the point that civilized or peaceful coexistence in a determinate geographical space could be impossible to achieve.
似乎自然而然会认为,人们对其他人类怀有相互尊重和宽容的审慎及伦理理由,对于新遇到的典型但非人类的生物个体也同样适用。人们还倾向于认为,它们会有类似的理由将我们人类视为本身就具有道德价值的生物。这种思路超越了生物学界限——也就是说,涉及人工(超级)智能个体——但这是一个安全的假设吗?这个问题关乎终极道德意义:人类个体、来自其他星球的个体以及人工智能形式的假设性非有机个体所具有的意义。本文探讨了为何我们与人工智能个体的可能关系可能比乍看之下更为复杂,因为它们的本质可能与我们截然不同,以至于在特定地理空间内实现文明或和平共处可能无法达成。